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Abstract: 
Despite its controversial history and the significant diffusion of biometrics 
from institutional settings such as border control and policing, to everyday 
use in commerce and personal devices, biometrics is now being re-
positioned as a neutral means to safeguard identity in the digital world. 
Given this proliferation of uses we argue that understanding perceptions of 
biometrics amongst ordinary citizens is necessary and long 
overdue.  Situating our analysis in the wider context of the views of 
governmental and biometric industry experts, we deploy Q-methodology in 
combination with political discourse analysis to examine the range of 
positions that have crystallized in ordinary discourse on issues arising from 
the use of biometrics for identification. Our analysis analysis uncovers four 
distinctive configurations that put into question a simplistic trade-off 
between security and privacy that dominates government and industry 
discourse, and underlines the importance of going beyond a narrow view 
of  technology ‘users’ to understand the political and social concerns that 
arise with and shape the uses of technology in contemporary society 
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Understanding public views of biometrics
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Introduction 
In 2004, Giorgio Agamben (2004), a renowned political philosopher, cancelled an 
academic visit to New York, refusing to go through US border-control procedures 
involving extensive use of biometrics. More than a decade later, refusing to travel 
does not protect one from being biometrically identified; the use of biometrics now 
extends far beyond policing and border control into multiple areas of everyday life. 
More physiological features are being used as biometric identifiers to identify people 
across physical and digital contexts. Fingerprints and retina scans are incorporated 
into personal devices such as laptops and smart phones, and their use is being 
explored in the banking industry. Face recognition is extensively employed in on-line 
social networks (Authors 2017); and new forms of biometrics, such as gait and 
brainwave analysis, are used in consumer electronics to help cultivate healthier 
lifestyles. 
 In this article, we examine public views of the use of biometrics for identity 
management. Our aim is to bring the voices of the lay public back into a debate that 
has been dominated by security experts and technical policy reports that take little 
notice of public views. We seek to capture and analyse citizen reflection on this 
complex policy issue, and to make visible the distinct patterns into which ordinary 
views of the use of biometrics crystallise (Danielson et al., 2012).  We focus on the 
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growing use of biometrics in everyday contexts, as well as in institutional settings 
(e.g. border control, policing). As these new technologies are rapidly altering the 
economy of rights and duties in society, the need for direct engagement with citizens 
increases (Callon et al., 2009). We use Q-methodology in conjunction with political 
discourse analysis (PDA) to capture the full range of viewpoints on the varied uses of 
biometrics in public life. This combination of methods allows us to provide a unique 
perspective on public views of biometrics. In contrast to survey methods, we do not 
seek to collect and aggregate individual views on biometrics. Rather, the combination 
of discourse analysis and Q method allows us to capture specific subject positions 
(Foucault) drawn from the available range of discourses on a topic, with which 
individuals can identify. Thus, using Q method we analyse both the breadth of debate 
on an issue (concourse), and the distribution of preferences and the distinctive 
patterns in which they coagulate, situated within the context of the wider discourses 
generated by actors such as governments, policy-making and civil society 
organisations.  This approach further enables us to move beyond the technological 
aspects of biometrics to broader concerns over digital citizenship in a context in 
which citizens as right-bearers are affected by an ever-more widespread use of 
biometrics in public and private life.  
 Our approach significantly departs from existing academic research in this 
domain. The post 9/11 rapid introduction of biometrics into border control settings 
linked them to controversial efforts to restrict civic rights in Western democracies in 
the light of terrorist threats (Bigo, 2005; Magnet, 2011; Muller, 2004), and more 
recently, in the context of immigration policy. As a result, debate has centred on the 
trade-off between the need for security and the right to privacy. Despite the fact that 
even in democratic societies security often trumps privacy, remarkably little effort has 
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been put into challenging the usefulness of these trade-offs for structuring debate and 
policy-making. Concentration on input from security experts, in the wake of an 
almost complete lack of research on the views of ordinary citizens (Fischer, 2009; 
Callon et al., 2009, p.9) and on individual views on privacy (e.g. Madden and Rainie, 
2015), has led to a lack of research that situates citizens’ views on the uses of 
biometrics in wider contexts that would foster more active engagement with the lay 
public in policy making (Omand, 2010, p.73). Similarly, a large number of industry-
led studies on biometrics analyse public opinion on biometrics (IBIA), focuses largely 
on the user-acceptance of specific technologies, without seeking to understand the 
impact of technology transfers from a security to an everyday context (see Authors, 
2017).  
 In our view, these problems can be attributed to the implicit assumption, by 
both proponents and critics of biometrics, that the public is not sufficiently informed 
to negotiate conflicting demands arising from the impact of technological change on 
their lives (Lanier, 2014). By contrast, we start from the presupposition that citizens 
are capable of expressing nuanced views that allow for sophisticated engagement with 
the range of issues at stake here. In this respect our work falls within a wider turn to 
the ‘everyday’ and a focus on ‘vernacular’ constructions of security (Vaughan-
Williams and Stevens, 2015), whilst seeking also to go beyond a securitization frame. 
Our study makes visible how citizens understand biometrics and their uses across a 
range of situations, without reducing them to zero-sum trade-offs between security 
and privacy, on the one hand, or treating them as isolated technologies on the other. 
 Our approach is further distinctive in the emphasis it places on how 
‘biometrics’ is understood and given meaning in and through available discourses that 
shape what biometric technologies may legitimately be used for, what the role of the 
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state and the private sector in the use and promotion of biometrics is, and what the 
legitimate scope for contestation around theses uses are.
 
In this respect, our approach 
resonates strongly with work on the co-production of technologies and their 
embedding in social identities, institutions and discourses (Jasanoff, 2004). In seeking 
to understand citizens’ views on the uses of biometrics we need to know how 
biometrics are represented in wider institutional discourses, and what ‘specific 
assumptions, judgments, contentions, dispositions, and capabilities’ these discourses 
embody (Dryzek and Niemeyer, 2008, pp. 481-2). Drawing on political discourse 
analysis (PDA) (author 2009), we start from the supposition that discourses – 
understood as the meanings and practices associated with a given domain that 
together denote a particular way of apprehending the world, ‘enabling those who 
subscribe to it to interpret bits of information and put them together into coherent 
stories’ (Dryzek, 1997, p.8) - both enable and constrain thought, speech and action - 
what we say as well as what we do (Author, 2000). They are constitutive of horizons 
of meaning, and offer positions with which individuals and groups may identify, and 
that may be contested (Author, 2012).  
 Our findings indicate a broad spectrum of citizen views on biometrics that 
goes beyond the aforementioned security vs. privacy trade-off. Views crystallise into 
four nuanced subject positions, reflecting awareness of the technological possibilities 
of biometrics but also of the political issues at stake in their deployment in various 
contexts. Each of these positions draws on wider discursive representations of 
biometrics in public discourse - analysed in the next section - but represent a 
distinctive perspective crystallised around a specific combination of concerns. In this 
respect, our work contributes to policy analysis (March and Olsen 1995, p.6; Fischer, 
2009, p.248) that emphasizes the importance of discursive practices, in addition to 
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more formal rules, in shaping the frameworks within which citizens, experts and 
officials act. 
 
Discursive representations of biometrics  
The documentation of individual identity has historically been closely linked to 
practices associated with citizenship, and continues to be so. Governments use a 
variety of bureaucratic, obligatory practices to turn their populations into ‘legible 
people’ (Scott, 1998; Noiriel, 2001) However, the establishment of such ‘regimes of 
representation’ (Caplan & Torpey, 2001, p.8) is not straightforward. ‘Identity’ is 
difficult to stabilise even in the most regimented systems of documentation (Caplan, 
2001, p.51). It requires a rigorous set of bureaucratic procedures to record and 
maintain identity-related information. At the same time, it is political as it constitutes 
people as political subjects with specific rights and duties, and involves moments of 
resistance from individuals and social groups, for instance, contesting the specific 
categories of information, included in or omitted from the official documentation of 
identity (LSE, 2005; Molokotos-Liederman, 2007).  
 With industry, governments engage in practices that govern the complex ways 
in which individuals and groups behave their producing and consuming activities 
(Tully, 2008 II, 3; Author, 2014). From a governmental perspective, biometrics are 
portrayed as technological solutions that aid the streamlining of mechanisms for 
collecting, codifying and verifying citizen identity (Mansfield, 2003; Home 
Office/UK Border Agency, 2010; Home Office, 2002; IPSC, 2006; Misuraca and 
Lusoli, 2010). The technological excellence of biometrics constitutes the core 
argument in favour of their use in a growing number of government activities ranging 
from border control to the collection of social benefits (Magnet 2011; Liberty Global, 
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2012). Here biometric technologies are used to stabilize personal identity in two 
ways: as a means of accurately verifying subjective claims of identity, and as a means 
to eliminate discrepancies between identity tokens, used as proofs of such claims, and 
government apparatuses that curates formal identification systems. This is achieved 
by tracing individual identity back to physiological signs (fingerprints, iris, voice, and 
so on) through a process that transforms the body into an identity token against which 
subjective claims of identity can be read (Van der Ploeg, 1999). Focussing 
identification procedures on the human body allows individuals to be identified 
without the need for written documents such as passports and identity cards, and is 
argued to safeguard formal identification systems from human error as it automates 
every stage of the process. As the IBIA (2013, p.1) argues: ‘What makes modern 
biometric use highly effective is technology that enables precise measurement 
coupled with computational power that allows measurements to be … converted to 
unique and secure identifiers that are easily used to determine and protect a person’s 
true identity.’ To this end, biometrics promise to establish procedures that can 
irrevocably identify citizens, granting them access to their rights and preventing them 
from claiming benefits to which they are not entitled. 
 Representations of biometrics in industry discourses (BI, 2013; IBIA, 2013 & 
the Joint Research Centre EU)
 
also emphasize the infallibility of these technologies, 
portraying biometrics as the endpoint of a long evolutionary path of identification 
technologies. An IBIA (2013, 1) white paper on biometrics exemplifies this trend: 
‘Contrary to popular belief, biometrics is not new … Man has used biometrics 
throughout recorded history to uniquely identify individuals, starting with the first 
handprint “signatures” of authors of paintings on cave walls over 30,000 years ago.’ 
Older practices (i.e. using thumbprints) are retrospectively recast as biometrics; a 
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Homeland Security & Defense Business Council (2011) document similarly starts 
with a historical account of the use of biometrics to prevent fraud in 1882. This 
strategy seeks to alleviate fears that more advanced technological solutions will alter 
underlying social practices; biometrics are portrayed as ‘merely’ automating historical 
forms of identification. The biometrics industry further annexes other images to this 
evolutionary view: new technologies are presented as ‘neutral,’ able to counter threats 
in the digital world and even to empower users (Ernst & Young, 2011; Accenture, 
2006). Driven by the need for convenience, the idea of biometrics as a value-neutral 
tool underwrites the diffusion of biometrics into contexts far beyond border control. 
Biometrics are presented as the ‘natural’ solution to the trouble people have with 
remembering multiple passwords.  
 The use of technology that purports to read the truth from a body is not simply 
a bureaucratic choice. It is a political issue of some significance. This is why 
academic research has been very critical of governmental policies (Agamben, 1998; 
Aradau, 2008).  Transforming the body into a series of digital signs that can be 
combined with other data in order to profile the population, changes our bio-political 
relationship with the state (Agamben, 2004; Fisher, 2015). Hence, it is argued that 
biometrics compress complex social relationships, reducing identity to a series of 
algorithms that can irrevocably identify a person without having to rely on cultural 
cues, deemed inefficient and possibly erroneous (Muller, 2004).  As bodies become 
‘biometrifiable’ citizenship is increasingly stripped of its symbolic and cultural 
attributes (Magnet, 2011, p.280), leaving us with a purely instrumental conception of 
what it means to belong to a specific state and its allocated territory. The politics of 
population movements is gradually transformed into a bureaucratic exercise (Amoore, 
2006; Bigo, 1998), and techniques initially reserved for ‘deviant’ social groups, such 
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as fingerprinting, are now migrated to larger parts of the population, becoming normal 
practice (Jumb et al., 2015).  
 
Beyond governance as control 
These approaches and critiques fall short in two important respects. First, focussing 
on biometrics exclusively as governmental technology to control populations offers 
limited scope to make sense of the proliferation of biometrics in everyday life. It 
specifically fails to address the incorporation of biometrics into consumer devices and 
on-line media (Authors 2017), which is at the root of growing societal excitement 
about new technologies and the new forms of social and political interaction they 
foster (Bennett and Segerberg, 2013). The focus of existing research on identity as a 
formal transaction between citizens and the state, where biometrics are primarily 
examined in contexts such as borders and where safety is of primary importance (Aas, 
2006, p.144), do not capture these new developments. However, it is precisely such 
uses that require scrutiny regarding their repercussions for citizenship as they expand 
the use of biometrics to everyday contexts. They raise significant issues concerning 
the boundaries between politics and bureaucracy, the actors to be held accountable 
when collecting biometric information and the economy of rights and duties shaping 
citizenship in digital environments.  
 This brings us to the second sense in which existing analyses, critical or not, 
falls short. Arguably more fundamentally, extant work typically rests on a passive 
view of subjectivity: citizens are viewed as objects of state policy, rather than active 
participants who are able to consent, contest, and change identity management 
practices (incorporating all of the ways in which we identify ourselves online and in 
everyday life). In this we concur with Vaughan-Williams and Stevens (2015) on the 
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importance of understanding citizens’ views in relation to policy rhetoric. Our 
approach further allows us to see how citizens draw on available discourses and 
construct a range of clearly discernable positions on biometrics that undercuts the 
security/privacy dichotomy. 
 Our approach challenges both the limited focus of the domains in which 
biometrics are deployed, and the passive view of subjectivity on which it rests. We 
focus on more recent developments of biometrics, including their use in personal 
devices (such as phones and laptops) and in commerce (e.g. workplace time-clocks 
and methods of access), as well as on traditional uses of biometrics. In addition to this 
wider empirical lens, we also seek to ‘bring citizens back in.’ Existing user research 
tends to concentrate narrowly on the usability of specific technologies. (For a critical 
overview, see IMPRINTS 2014, pp.7-9.) By contrast, we are interested in the views 
of users as citizens rather than narrowly as general users of commercial products. This 
leads to an analysis of wider issues associated with biometrics, to consider how 
citizens understand, respond to and shape their environments, how they view the 
relation between security and privacy, and what their demands are in terms of 
accountability and consent, in both commercial and non-commercial contexts.  
 Hence, our focus is on the ways in which ordinary citizens actively make 
sense of and challenge the views expressed by dominant authorities, as well as on the 
need to take these views into consideration in the policy-making process. Combining 
Q method and PDA allows us to capture empirically the distinctive subject positions 
articulated by citizens, drawn from these wider discursive representations of 
biometrics. As noted earlier, in contrast to survey methodologies our analytical focus 
is on the discursive positions articulated by ordinary citizens against the backdrop of a 
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horizon of meanings generated by actors such as governments, policy-making and 
civil society organisations. 
 
Research design and method 
 
Combining Q-method and discourse analysis 
Q methodology, first introduced in political science by Dryzek and Berejikian (1993), 
is now widely used in public administration and policy studies to understand how 
government policies are perceived by public servants who implement them (Jeffares 
and Skelcher, 2011), as well as by citizens as their recipients (Willis and Jeffares, 
2011). The benefits of the method lay in its logic of abduction (Watts and Stenner, 
2005), also shared by PDA (Glynos and Howarth, 2007), which favours the 
generation of themes by the research subjects rather than the analyst, endeavouring to 
make visible the primary ways in which themes are ‘interconnected or otherwise 
related by a group of participants’ (Brown, 1980 & 1993). This procedure fits well 
with our emphasis on the discursive representations of biometrics and the need to 
understand the particular meanings given to biometrics in different contexts and by 
different actors. To capture the way in which particular meanings are woven together 
into distinctive positions, we draw on the discourse theoretical account of 
‘articulation’ developed by Laclau and Mouffe. When discursive elements are 
articulated together, the meanings of all the elements are altered as a result (Laclau & 
Mouffe, 1985). It follows that views of ‘biometrics’ will differ depending on the 
wider discursive contexts of use in which they are inserted. The use of Q 
methodology helps us to reveal the dominant viewpoints on biometrics as articulated 
by ordinary citizens in a systematic, holistic fashion (Brown, 1993; Watts and 
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Stenner, 2012, p.42). This is achieved ‘by modelling subjects in terms of their 
reactions to a set of statements about a given domain’ (Dryzek and Berejikian, 1990, 
p.50). In this way the method enables us to trace the manner in which specific subject 
positions are crystallized from an available horizon of meanings, revealing the ways 
citizens collectively make sense of biometrics and their uses.  
 The use of this combination of methods adds value both to Q methodology 
and to PDA. The theoretical resources of PDA furnish Q method with a more 
sophisticated understanding of both the breadth of discussion, and the actors’ 
viewpoints on the topic under discussion. PDA makes visible the fact that the 
concourse is not simply a given set of discrete statements, but a discursive horizon 
that shapes and sets limits to what can be done within a given terrain. As noted above, 
on this account ‘biometrics’ is not simply a neutral terrain of techniques deployed for 
the purposes of identity management. How it is understood depends upon the precise 
meanings attributed to, and practices associated with it, by a wide range of actors, 
including governments, commercial and civil society organisations. PDA also 
provides Q method with a theoretically robust understanding of subjectivity. Q 
method rejects the behaviourist view that subjectivity is something merely mental or 
inner, unrelated to the world (Watts and Stenner, 2012, p.19). PDA supplements this 
work with an account of subjectivity as discursively constituted, rather than as given. 
Drawing on Foucault, we take ‘subject position’ as incorporating ‘both a conceptual 
repertoire and a location for persons within the structure of rights for those that use 
that repertoire. As Davies and Harre (1990, p.46) put it,  
Once having taken up a particular position as one’s own, a person inevitably 
sees the world from the vantage point of that position and in terms for the 
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particular images, metaphors, storylines and concepts which are made relevant 
within the discursive practice in which they are positioned.  
The factors extracted by Q method – the common or shared meanings crystallizing 
from the analysis – constitute specific subject positions, that is, places from which 
individuals can speak and act.
2
 Conversely, Q method supplements PDA by providing 
a robust scientific method with which to capture empirically and analyse 
quantitatively the dominant social viewpoints with which individual can identify.  
 
Research design: establishing the concourse and Q sample 
Jeffares and Skelcher summarise the essence of Q methodology as follows: ‘each 
participant in the sample (the P sample) sorts a series of statements (a Q sample) 
representative of the breadth of debate on an issue (the concourse) into a distribution 
of preference (a Q sort) from which statistically significant factors are derived and 
then interpreted’ (Jeffares and Skelcher, 2011, p.1253).  
 The starting point for any Q study is the selection of statements to be ordered 
by participants. These statements need to be representative of the wider horizon of 
discourses – the concourse - on the chosen topic of inquiry; Stephenson (1988, p.9) 
appropriately describes this as the ‘cultural heritage’ forming ‘the fertile soil from 
which new subjectivity grows’. The concourse reflects the volume of discussion on 
this topic (Brown, 1986, p.58; Watts and Stenner, 2012, p.34) that may include 
interviews with relevant participants (Jeffares, 2011, p.1257), focus groups, analysis 
of academic, media and other texts (Dryzek and Berijikian, 1993). Our concourse is 
                                                     
2
 Watts and Stenner (2012, 42) equates individual Q-sorts with expressions of subject 
positions. In our view, the factors extracted as a result of the analysis represent 
subject positions in the sense in which Foucault uses the term.  
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formed by the available representations of biometrics in institutional discourses, 
including governmental, industry, civil society and academic discourses – discussed 
above. We analysed government reports from the Department of Homeland Security, 
the UK Cabinet Office, the Home Office as well as committees from both Houses, EU 
commissioned documents and reports, industry promotional material and white 
papers, think tank reports, civil society reports on surveillance and privacy, press 
articles and finally academic literature on biometrics, surveillance, identity and 
privacy (see Appendix A). This allowed us to select statements capturing the specific 
language in which discourses on biometrics are articulated. The concourse consisted 
of 170 statements related to various uses of biometrics for digital identification. The 
next stage consisted in narrowing these statements down into our Q sample.  
 The use of classification matrices as heuristic devices for selecting statements 
is well established in Q studies (e.g. Jeffares and Skelcher, 2011; Sullivan, Williams, 
and Jeffares 2011). We adapted Dryzek and Berekian’s classification scheme, 
combining the types of argumentative claims made - definitive (concerning the 
meaning of terms), designative (concerning questions of fact), evaluative (concerning 
something’s worth) or advocative (concerning what should or should not exist) - with 
the identified discourse elements (1993, 51). The discourse elements identified do not 
constitute categories defined in a priori fashion by the researcher; rather they are 
themes that emerged from the collected materials. The elements we identified are: 
1. Identity refers to a focus on the use of the human body for identification. It 
also covers issues related to the assurance of individual identity through biometric 
technologies.  
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2. Empowerment captures issues relating to data usage and control of data. It 
also includes issues relating to the ease of use of biometric technologies, seen as a 
means to empower citizens. 
3. Security contains statements on the use of biometrics for border control and 
policing. Issues revolve mainly around the safety of biometrics as digital records, 
their ability to irrevocably identify individuals and their effectiveness in battling 
identity fraud and terrorism. 
4. Accountability explores the types of actors (e.g. government, industry) that 
should be held accountable of the various issues of biometrics. The possibility of 
function creep arising from the collection of biometric data is a key concern.  
5. Surveillance focuses on the possibility to monitor public spaces without 
consent as well as the intrusiveness of biometric technologies in work settings and in 
private activities.  
 Once the matrix was created all the statements were classified into the various 
categories through an iterative process. Initially, each researcher classified the 
statements on her own. Classifications were compared until a consensus was reached. 
In selecting the 50 statements for the Q sample, we were mindful of obtaining a 
balance between the plurality of themes and types of argument, and avoiding 
duplication of meanings and issues.  
 
Research design: the P-sample and sorting 
In deciding on the number of participants, we followed the standard guideline of 40-
60 participants. Our selection rationale focused on using individuals representing 
mobile respondents, in tune with current developments in technology, politics and 
society in general. Our P sample consisted of 60 student respondents, including 30 
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respondents from UK/EU and Overseas (non-EU) countries each, and an equal gender 
distribution.
 3
 For the sorting stage, an on-line tool POETQ, reflecting the card-based 
process, was used. This facilitated participation and increased responses making the 
sorting process less time consuming (Jeffares and Skelcher, 2011). Participants raked 
the 50 statements from +5 (most agree) to -5 (most disagree) using a forced ranked 
distribution (inverted pyramid shape). On completion of the Q-sorts, the participants 
were asked to comment on how they ranked the statements especially the ones at +/-5 
and +/-4. These explanations contributed to selecting the factor solution but also to 
interpreting the subject positions represented by each factor.  
 
Factor analysis 
The responses (Q-sorts) were correlated and then analysed through a by-person factor 
analysis that reveals correlated groups of statement preferences. We used PQMethod 
2.33 (Schmolck, 2014) to carry out the statistical analysis. Participants with a loading 
of 0.36 and above were flagged for a varimax rotation to maximize the loading in 
each factor. The choice of the varimax rotation ensured that the factors selected as the 
final solution only contained Q-sorts that were highly correlated with each other and 
                                                     
3
 The broad selection of participants also worked against an overly northern-
hemisphere focus. As is common practice, respondents were offered an incentive to 
participate in the study. The Q sort was administered to participants in a PC lab, 
ensuring completion of the sort under similar conditions. The availability of specific 
technologies at the time (2013) are not particularly crucial, as the design of the study 
was not limited to a focus on existing technologies, but rather on the possibilities for 
empowerment, scrutiny etc. opened up in principle by biometric identification 
technologies.  
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that were uncorrelated with the remaining Q-sorts (Brown, 1993). We selected four 
factors as our final solution as this offered a nuanced view of citizens, favouring a 
context-driven assessment of the use of biometrics. (In a three factor solution this 
detail was lost offering instead indications of possible acceptance of biometrics 
according to circumstances.) All factors had eigenvalues greater than 1.0 and at least 
one Q sort loaded significantly on the factor. Table 1 presents the factor correlations, 
the number of Q sorts significantly loading on each factors and the level of variance 
explained by each factor.  
 
Table 1 [here] 
 
The four factors together explained 47% of the study variance.
4
 They were selected as 
the best solution since they revealed views on the topic which showed how existing 
dilemmas (wholeheartedly rejecting vs uncritically accepting biometrics) in public 
discourse were overcome in practice. At this stage the task of the researcher is that of 
interpretation, of ‘understanding the character of these synthesized factors based on 
the placing of statements’ (Jeffares et al, 2011, p.1258). Table 2 below presents the 
resulting factor arrays: a single Q sort per factor is configured to represent the ‘ideal’ 
viewpoint expressed by the particular factor. The statements used to create these 
‘ideal’ Q sorts are those that statistically distinguish the discourse from other factors 
at the P‹ 0.01 or 99% confidence level.  
 
                                                     
4
 Anything around 35-40% is considered a sound solution on the basis of common 
factors (Watts and Stenner, 2012, p.105). 
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Table 2 [here] 
 
Results – The factors 
The analysis of the Q sorts identified four distinctive discursive configurations or 
subject positions relating to the use of biometrics for managing digital identities. 
These viewpoints represent particular articulations of the elements present in the 
existing discursive horizon. Theoretically this reflects the relational conception of 
meaning underpinning PDA: each element does not have an inherent, essential 
meaning, but gains its meaning from the way in which it is combined with other 
elements (Howarth, 2009, p.311). This is particularly clear in our analysis that shows 
that while each of the four subject positions display a concern with privacy, they 
significantly diverge on other issues. There is only one statistically significant 
consensus statement (41) referring to the possibility of linking personal data from 
various databases through biometric identifiers. This shows a concern with the use of 
biometric data that is shared across all citizen viewpoints. The participants, depending 
on their understanding of biometrics, arranged the rest of the statements differently, 
revealing an interesting variety of views on the uses of biometrics. These views range 
from the overtly sceptical Privacy Advocates (Factor A) who express serious concerns 
about the use of biometrics for identification to Casual Adopters (Factor D) who 
espouse an easy-going instrumental use of biometrics, treating them as a 
technological solution to a variety of identity-related issues. Between these two 
viewpoints, there are Conservative Techies (Factor B) and Safety Champions (Factor 
C) who express more nuanced views on biometrics. Conservative Techies focus 
primarily on uses of biometrics that allow them to safeguard their personal devices 
(e.g. smartphones, laptops) while Safety Champions favour uses of biometrics for 
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access control to secure places. Below we outline each factor, representing a version 
of views on biometrics. Numbers in parentheses refer to the statements & their 
weightings. 
 
Factor A: Privacy Advocates 
With each new development in biometric technology, users have less control over 
their data, not knowing when, where and why it is used (31: +4). People can be 
identified without their consent, and quite often, without their knowledge (42: +4). 
Remote biometrics, like face and gait recognition (3: +2), intensify this lack of control 
on behalf of citizens raising concerns about bodily integrity too. Privacy, as we know 
it, is coming to an end (7: +5, 50: +1). People are caught in a world where nothing is 
forgotten as personal data can be linked irrevocably to individuals (38: +1). When it 
comes to the management of digital identities, the body should not be seen as a 
natural password (4: 0). On the contrary, people should be in control of how their data 
is collected, stored and used (37: +3). Most importantly, they must have the right to 
opt-out from services, preventing collection of personal information (1: +3). Intrusive 
uses like biometric time clocks in industry or face recognition in social media (5: -3, 
19: -4) affecting individual freedom (44: +4) should be avoided. To counterbalance 
state surveillance, citizens need to be more active. They have the right to record 
police action on their smart phones and to circulate it on social media (32:+1). They 
should also use any device, such as privacy visors, that protect them from 
unauthorized identification while in public (30: 0). Finally, government arguments in 
favour of biometrics for efficiency and convenience need to be carefully scrutinized 
(35: -5). The promotion of more individualistic models of social life, as all devices 
Page 18 of 43
Political Studies
Political Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
19 
 
19 
 
will be bound to their owner, undermines community (14: 0) and paves the way for 
increased monitoring of the population (28: -3, 26: -3). 
 
Factor B: Conservative Techies  
Our bodies are like natural passwords that we all carry with us at all times (4: +5), 
making biometrics a good alternative to the growing number of identification 
paraphernalia, such as PINs, that people need to memorise (6; +3). Biometrics seem 
to be a great way to safeguard personal devices (e.g. mobile phones) from loss or theft 
(12: +2). Moreover, they can be used in time clocks to allow companies to have better 
control of their labour force (5: 0). However, people should be wary of the possibility 
of extensive profiling. It is for this reason that biometrics should not be used in 
domestic settings (18: -3) since they have the potential to disclose sensitive 
information about their users’ habits. The same applies to the use of face recognition 
software in mobile devices and social media (43: -3). However, biometrics are still 
seen as a particularly promising technology for security purposes. They are not 
infallible, since they involve a range of human decisions (23: +4), but, they do help 
governments to effectively lock foreign nationals into their identity (28: 0). Given 
this, citizens should be supportive of instead of jeopardizing biometric technologies 
by recording police action during demonstrations (32: -3) or altering their facial 
features with headwear (30: -5). Biometrics are not about state surveillance (45: -3). 
There is strong legislation against linking personal data from different databases (15: -
1) for unrelated purposes. Finally, negative connotations accompanying certain 
biometrics (e.g. fingerprints) or concerns over community life (14: -5) should not 
become an obstacle to more efficient applications (8: -4). 
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Factor C: Safety Champions 
Biometrics can be useful as long as personal data is well protected (49: +5). They 
strengthen safety and are convenient. Their use should be embraced instead of 
thinking that biometrics spell an end to individual privacy (50: -4). This is a 
widespread view that needs to be contested since it is highly inaccurate (48: -3). 
Securely identifying individuals is particularly important in border control. As a 
result, digital passports will need to include more biometric information (27: +3), and 
people should be willing to have their personal data shared internationally to speed up 
immigration processing in an increasingly globalised world (22: +2). Data sharing 
among governments does not mean that states lose control over citizens’ data (16: -2) 
nor that the process is insecure (23: -4). However, people need to be alert to the 
possibility of having their personal data linked for unrelated purposes (15: +4). 
Governments need to be accountable too. For this reason, it is a good thing that 
protesters can record police action during demonstrations (32: +3) and post the videos 
on social network sites. It endows citizens with a sense of empowerment over state 
operations. Biometrics can also be used in domestic settings as they provide solutions 
to several safety concerns involving children and the elderly (18: 0). Crucially, 
biometrics facilitate improving authentication in social networking sites (19: 0) and 
increase safety on the Internet. To promote such uses of biometrics, fears over bodily 
integrity and loss of consent (3: -2) should be addressed. Biometrics should not be 
seen as tracking mechanisms (50: -4) reducing privacy (13: -5) and undermining 
community (14: -5) but as technologies for increasing security in a changing world. 
 
Factor D: Casual Adopters 
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 People worry more about convenience and security of transactions than issues of 
privacy (13: +5). This does not mean that biometrics jeopardize privacy (1: 0). This is 
quite an inaccurate view which is unfortunately widely held (48: +4). Biometrics are 
technological solutions to a number of identification problems; a swipe of the hand 
may provide faster and more secure identification procedures (25: +3) since asking 
people to remember multiple passwords rarely works. Biometrics help governments to 
securely identify mobile and versatile populations. Linking people irreversibly to their 
identities is crucial in a globalised world (26: +3). To this end, biometric resident 
permits can be an answer to immigration problems (26: +3). In tandem with border 
security, biometrics provide efficient solutions to problems pertaining to identity theft 
and fraud in financial transactions (10: +2). It follows that people should be willing to 
use their fingerprints or face to identify themselves in institutions such as banks. 
Finally, biometrics can be fun too. Face recognition software in mobile devices can be 
quite useful in several social settings (43: +2). People should embrace such 
innovations instead of worrying about their impact on their careers, credit held and 
families (46: -3). Biometrics is a reliable technology (9: -5) which endows people 
with more control over their personal data (31: -1). Contrary to popular 
understandings, it safeguards individual identity without undermining community (14: 
-5).  
 
We now turn to a deeper analysis of these configurations so as to develop a clearer 
sense of the subject positions they encapsulate and what they mean in terms of our 
understanding of emerging contemporary conceptions of digital citizenship. 
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Citizens’ voices: emerging viewpoints 
How people and institutions handle privacy and security concerns … will 
determine the new boundaries for citizens everywhere… What seems like 
defined debates today over privacy and security will broaden to questions of 
who controls and influences virtual identities and thus citizens themselves 
(Schmidt and Cohen, 2013, p.34 & p.81).
 
 
Digital citizenship is typically defined as the norms of appropriate, responsible 
behaviour with regard to technology use. In our view, digital citizenship above all 
relates to the ability of citizens to give voice to their concerns about this range of 
issues and to carve out distinctive positions on key topics. In a world where biometric 
forms of identification are used ever more extensively, policy-makers can no longer 
ignore public views on issues of accountability and empowerment, as well as the 
regulation of uses of personal data. Indeed, governments and industry are beginning 
to give attention to developing more user-centric tools of interaction. However, even 
here the role of the citizen is too narrowly circumscribed as ‘users,’ focusing almost 
exclusively on ease of use, rather than on more robust measures to enable citizen 
control over the collection and use of their data. The four discursive positions 
emerging from our research also suggest, contrary to expert views, that there is no 
simple zero sum trade-off between privacy and security. Our claim is that the four 
positions identified indeed encapsulate the wider held views of ordinary members of 
society, prefiguring the possible configurations around which different conceptions of 
digital citizenship may increasingly form. 
 Privacy Advocates understand their digital identities as a set of ‘digital traces’ 
(Schmidt and Cohen, 2013, pp.55- 6). They are conscious of the fact that digital 
interactions leave behind identifiable permanent markers of activity, and that the state 
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and corporations engage in extensive and potentially illegitimate collection and use of 
personal data. They are particularly concerned about the fact that they do not have 
control over this process and that there exists little by way of mechanisms of consent 
through which these interactions are managed. Ours is the first generation of humans 
to have an indelible record of our activities. Privacy Advocates are concerned about 
this ‘data permanence’ (Schmidt and Cohen, 2013, pp.55- 6). As a result, they are the 
citizens who ‘have the self-awareness to closely manage their online identities and the 
virtual lives they lead’ (Schmidt and Cohen, 2013, p.36). They are likely to insist on 
more user-centric designs, incorporating mechanisms of meaningful consent, so as to 
enable informed regulation of the collection and use of personal data. They are also 
the group most likely to demand ‘the right to be forgotten’, now inscribed in 
European and Californian law. As one respondent argues: ‘I have the right to be 
forgotten, to be free, and unfollowed’. 
 These concerns are supplemented by an understanding of privacy as both an 
individual right and a societal good. Privacy Advocates are troubled by the linkage 
between specific biometric identifiers and particular individuals that may limit shared 
usage of goods (e.g. laptops and cars accessed by fingerprints) and undermine a sense 
of community.
5
 This linkage also raises questions of bodily integrity given that 
contemporary biometrics are not simply neutral technologies that we can use without 
any further impact on our lives. Rather, Privacy Advocates recognise that they 
contribute to and redefine our senses of self. One respondent put it thus: ‘This is a 
violation of human rights. It violates personal space and goes above and beyond the 
call of the state. If we start processes like this we will all eventually become robots.’ 
                                                     
5
 Apple recently responded to this concern by allowing users of iPhones to register 
more than one fingerprint on a device, enabling multiple users of a single device. 
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This response echoes with public resistance to the use of full-body scanners at 
airports. In addition to expressing safety concerns, the public raised cultural and 
ethical concerns with regard to their use (Grabell, 2012). Digitized visualization 
dissecting the body and projecting ‘fragmented and reduced elements of a person,’ 
poses ‘profound new questions of the political geographies of bodily boundaries’ 
(Amoore and Hall, 2009, p.46). 
 Privacy advocates also problematise biometrics as intrusive. They reject most 
uses of biometrics since they consider them as forms of surveillance - by either the 
state or by private corporations - using fallible technologies. Privacy once lost cannot 
be recouped. Hence the u gent need to introduce mechanisms to safeguard control and 
accountability. While a considerable amount of progress has been made with regard to 
‘privacy by design’ (Nissenbaum, 2004), work in this area is often based upon a 
narrow view of ‘user’ simply as ‘consumers’ of technology, rather than as citizens 
concerned with the reach of states and corporations into their lives. These wider 
concerns of Privacy Advocates resonate strongly with the positions advocated by 
many civil society organisations, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation, that 
campaign to limit the collection of biometrics, as well as other organisations such as 
the Biometrics Institute that provides guidance on good practice in the collection, use 
and storage of biometric data (Lynch, 2012). While such specialised civil society 
organisations have long been critical of the way in which the state, industry and social 
media use biometrics, the wider public is now starting to engage with the range of 
new issues raised by biometrics. Artistic techniques – such as the use of face-painting 
to bedevil face recognition technologies (DIS Magazine, 2013) – are reasonably 
common and the public has begun to express annoyance with the use of new 
technologies such as google glass in public spaces. Privacy Advocates are most 
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strongly in favour of sousveillance - surveillance from below’ (Mann, Nolan and 
Wellman, 2003) - as a legitimate strategy to counter excesses by authorities. 
Deploying technologies generally reserved for state use to call-out figures of authority 
abusing their power is now becoming commonplace, and are likely to be used more 
extensively, by marginalised groups, but also by those who are worried about the ever 
more extensive use of biometrics to record information about our public activities.  
 Conservative Techies also view the body as a way to identify oneself. In 
contrast to Privacy Advocates, their views are closer to that of the biometrics industry 
in positively framing the human body as a set of unique attributes for identification 
that people carry with them all the time. Central to the constitution of biometrics as 
the identification technology par excellence, especially in industry discourses, is the 
idea that body parts are unique and unchangeable. This property of biometrics is 
almost always stated in a ‘factual’ way in industry reports that propose biometrics as 
the logical solution to our increasing need to securely assert individual identity 
(Tistarelli, Li and Chellappa, 2009). Bodies are portrayed as ‘natural passwords’ as 
they contain information that is unique and cannot be removed from its bearer. 
Conservative Techies share the prevailing view in the biometrics industry that such 
technologies are privacy enhancing as they protect personal data from theft. An Ernest 
& Young (2011, p.2) report puts it thus: biometric technology can help guard against 
attempts to establish fraudulent multiple identities. As a Conservative Techie puts it: 
‘First technology, then security must be perfected – when this is done, then I would 
feel that the benefits would make it worth having a biometric ID.’  
 Conservative techies are also distinctive in that they are content that 
biometrics is used for security purposes and, in particular, for the state to use them ‘to 
lock foreign nationals into their identities.’ They also express the strongest view in 
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favour of iris recognition, as it does not have the criminal associations of 
fingerprinting. These views resonates strongly with widespread discourses that 
implicitly attribute the ills of society to the presence of ‘foreigners’ and ‘immigrants,’ 
as well as with state practices focusing on the control of immigration and refugees. 
Lynch (2012, p.3), for instance, argues that undocumented people living in the USA 
are ‘uniquely affected by the expansion of biometrics collection programs’. Similarly, 
a key trigger in the adoption of biometric technologies in the EU includes the need to 
be able to identify individuals securely and efficiently to minimize security risks (in 
particular terrorism), illegal immigration, unwanted ‘bogus’ asylum seekers, 
‘overstayers’ (European Commission, 2011, p.3) and ‘benefit migrants’, while also 
needing to ensure easier travel for ‘trusted travellers’ (US DHS), ‘genuine visa 
applicants’, citizens, as well as ease the movement of citizens and their benefits 
within the EU. These views reflect the UK Home Office (2013, p.5) argument that 
biometric residence permits ‘make it easier for individuals to prove their identity, 
immigration status and entitlements’, as well as industry suggestions that it is 
necessary to safeguard society through biometrics from ‘cyberwolves’ (Accenture, 
2006). 
 Working with a strong public/private divide, Conservative Techies oppose the 
integration of biometrics into personal devices and utilities in the home (e.g. a fridge 
that records the eating habits of household inhabitants) since this is viewed as too 
intrusive into private life. They are, however, not opposed to it being deployed in the 
workplace (e.g. in time-clocks). Here the value of efficiency is placed alongside that 
of traditional security, with biometrics seen as technologies that could secure both. 
This strong divide between what is acceptable in private as opposed to in public is 
underwritten by an absence of scepticism about the potential misuses to which 
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biometric data collection are subject, and little awareness of the complexities of the 
potential trade-offs between security and privacy. Conservative Techies are not 
worried about data linkage. A ‘having it all’ attitude - ‘securing’ public spaces while 
protecting the home from intrusion - results from this trust in traditional authorities. 
 The third configuration, Safety Champions, entails a transactional view of 
identity. Identity here is seen as the information we use to identify ourselves in 
formal, institutional settings, and technologies are viewed as neutral instruments 
deployed in the service of identifying oneself. Like Conservative Techies, Safety 
Champions are content with biometrics at the border. Yet, their transactional 
understanding of identity is supplemented with a serious concern over safety in 
private spaces. To this end, they view biometrics primarily as a means to ensure 
access control over secure spaces such as the household or virtual spaces (e.g. 
accounts for on-line social networks). This echoes an argument prevalent in the 
biometrics industry where biometrics are promoted as tools enabling privacy and 
safeguarding individual identity. As Accenture (2006, p.3) suggests: ‘Simply keying 
in some personal data - which can be stolen in a phishing scam … - is no longer 
enough to assure identity and deter fraud.’ As the value of personal data increases, 
people become more aware of the need to safeguard information linked to their 
identity. Given this, biometric identifiers - ‘something we are’ and something we 
cannot ‘leave behind’ – are primary means for establishing digital safety. Safety 
Champions echo this view in their emphasis on digital safety in a wide range of 
spheres. It is particularly evident in their belief that the government should play a role 
in the reduction of fraud, an argument which forms one of the key drivers of 
developments in e-government. A report by the European Commission (Maghiros et 
al., 2005, p.7) suggests that: ‘Modern economics require increasing levels of mobility 
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on the part of the workforce … physical identity is increasingly being replaced … by 
its digital equivalent… Biometric technologies seem to offer a solution for stronger 
identification.’ However, Safety Champions are rather more sceptical of the potential 
consequences of commercial uses of existing biometric technologies and their 
implications for privacy, suggesting that under these circumstances, ‘privacy as we 
know it would be a thing of the past’.  
 This healthy scepticism - in contrast to Conservative Techies - is also present 
in the position of Safety Champions on the possibilities of misuse of data once 
collected. Concerned about loss of privacy and bodily integrity as well as issues of 
consent and accountability, they are in many respects closer to Privacy Advocates 
than to Conservative Techies, advocating the use of souveillance and other 
mechanisms to keep governments accountable. They are less interested than 
Conservative Techies in the use of biometrics in personal devices, and hence do not 
share what we call the ‘enjoyment factor’, which is most prominent in those 
identifying as Causal Adopters. However, they positively engage with uses of 
biometrics to safeguard potentially vulnerable sectors of the population, such as 
children and the elderly. Far from being tools of surveillance, on this view, biometrics 
are regarded as technologies that increase security in a changing world.  
 Here an interesting shift is present in regard to trust in a progressively more 
complex world: as biometrics increasingly encompass personal uses, they become 
constitutive of how people build their relationships around technological devices and 
their ability to verify identity (Dardy, 1990). Trust, rather than being the outcome of 
reciprocal exchange of information between people, is technology-based, echoing the 
corporate slogan of a leading French biometric company Morpho (2013): ‘Creating 
trust around the world’.
 
The need to protect one’s identity is also increasingly coupled 
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with the need for convenience valued by Safety Champions: ‘I always forget the 
password that I set. It costs time to remember it while I can always bring my body 
with me. It's convenient in my point of view.’ Biometrics, it is argued, solve this 
problem. This is a view that is taken to its extreme by Casual Adopters. 
 Casual Adopters hold the most encompassing view of digital identity. For 
them, it is the sum of all available information about an individual. Echoing a widely 
held view that ‘privacy as we know it is a thing of the past’ (Accentrure 2014) those 
who identify with this position believe that privacy is no longer is tenable, and 
positively celebrate the technologies with which we live today. Like Safety 
Champions, they believe that they can provide their personal data to governments, as 
long as there are appropriate safeguards in place. Uniquely, they also express trust in 
the technological infrastructures in place for handling personal data, echoing industry 
and governmental discourses that portray biometrics as ‘merely’ technical. As we 
have seen, governments and industry have developed an intricate web of discourses 
promoting biometrics through arguments around technological progress and 
neutrality; the idea of biometrics as value-neutral means to secure identified ends 
propelled the diffusion of biometrics to contexts far beyond border control. Equally 
constitutive of this development has been the emerging commitment by the biometrics 
industry to address privacy concerns accompanying biometrics. This has been done 
by seeking to develop applications that allow users to control their biometric data, and 
through adopting professional codes of conduct and privacy charters (IBIA, 2014). 
The latter occurred largely as a result of pressure by civil society organizations such 
as the Biometrics Institute (2013) that developed Privacy Guidelines ‘to provide a 
universal guide for suppliers, end users, managers and purchasers of biometric 
systems’. The argument for neutrality supports the idea – core to the views espoused 
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by Casual Adopters - that once technical issues are addressed and privacy checks are 
done, all problems are solved. This, precisely, is what is assumed by those promoting 
their use: once the public is made aware of the need to use biometrics - through the 
deployment of justifications based on security, safety, efficiency, technological 
prowess and other reasons - they will appear to be neutral, even natural and above all, 
unproblematic technologies. 
 
Conclusion 
Given these distinctive views on digital identity and their relation to privacy and 
security, it is not the case, as widely argued, that the public is unable to form and 
express views on the complicated issues that arise in the wake of the ever more 
widespread use of biometrics in everyday life. It is also clear that everything depends 
on contextual articulations between biometrics and the other key factors identified: 
citizen views on security; on the use of biometrics in public, personal and domestic 
spaces; on whether individuals are concerned with data collection, usage and sharing; 
whether they think governments and industry should be held accountable and are 
responsible for the use of citizens’ personal data. The results of our research provide a 
first snapshot of the distinctive positions that have crystallized thus far. Given the 
rapidity of change in the use and diffusion of biometrics, these distinctive positions as 
identified in our research are likely to become more prominent in public debate. 
 It is crucial that we remain cognizant of the fact that the processes of 
articulation giving rise to each of the discursive positions are deeply political in 
nature: they are not determined, even as they are shaped by ongoing developments in 
our contemporary world. The diffusion of biometrics will continue to challenge and 
complicate our conceptions of the boundaries between politics and bureaucracy, as 
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well as of our conceptions of accountability in an ever more highly digitized world. It 
is notable that there currently are relatively weak concerns about the uses of large-
scale personal data for commercial use. This is likely to become an area of greater 
concern as the public becomes aware of the commercial value of ‘big data’ that trades 
largely on aggregation and analysis of data that is collected for different purposes and 
without consent. The uses of biometrics in personal devices are likely further to blur 
the divide between what is considered private and what is considered public, and thus 
available for scrutiny. Together, these will shape our conceptions of what it means to 
be a responsible citizen in a digital environment. It is crucial that citizens are 
consulted in the development of new regulations as well as in the development of 
novel technologies and mechanisms for such consultation.  
 Using a combination of Q-methodology and political discourse analysis, we 
have been able to show how distinctive viewpoints crystallise out of wider discourses 
on biometrics. These wider discourses - articulated by both governmental 
organisations and the biometrics industry - have tended to remain trapped in an 
apparent zero-sum trade-off between security and privacy. The viewpoints uncovered 
in our research shows how citizens have moved beyond a zero-sum game, taking up 
more complex positions that shape whether and in what contexts the use of biometrics 
are acceptable.   
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Seeing like a citizen – Tables 
 
Table 1 
Discourse A B C D 
Variance 
explained 
(%) 
Number of 
coefficients 
>0.36 
A 1.000 0.1962 -0.0209 -0.0429 25 30 
B  1.000 0.4436 0.4226 9 8 
C   1.000 0.3888 7 5 
D    1.000 6 3 
 
 
Table 2: Factor arrays: Factor q-sort values for each statement 
 
 Statements  Factors 
   A B C D 
1. As companies become better able to monitor our every move, 
consumers who want to maintain their privacy should be given the 
option to opt out. 
 
+3 2 +1 0 
2. Biometrics, such as iris scans, can produce medical information, 
allowing people subsequently to be profiled according to their 
current and potential health status.  
 
0 +4 -1 0 
3. Remote biometrics, using face or gait recognition, defies many of 
our deeply ingrained values concerning bodily integrity, freedom 
from arbitrary inspection, and requirements for consent. 
 
+2 -1 -2 0 
4. Our bodies are like natural passwords or identity cards that we all 
carry with us at all times and that we can never leave at home.  
 
0 +5 +1 +1 
5. Industry should embrace biometric time clocks – based on hand  -3 0 -2 -1 
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geometry or finger printing - that can simply and accurately 
capture labour data. 
6. We need to find a better alternative to all this traditional 
identification paraphernalia such as cards, passwords and PINs.  
 
-1 +3 +2 +2 
7. In the wrong hands, biometrics have the potential to violate 
privacy. 
 
+5 +5 +5 +3 
8. Iris scanning is more acceptable than fingerprint recognition, 
since it does not have criminal associations.  
 
-1 -4 +1 -2 
9. Biometric identification relies on technology that is far from 
proven. 
 
-1 +1 -3 -5 
10. Customers are likely to be willing to lodge two fingerprints and 
their facial image with their bank, if it means protection against 
banking fraud. 
 
0 +1 0 +2 
11. If my phone had a secure palm recognition app to securely 
authenticate my identity, I’d be happy to use to connect with 
banks and other organisations. 
 
-2 0 0 0 
12. Mobile phone owners should be prepared to download gait 
recognition software on their phones to prevent others accessing 
their information in the event of theft or loss.  
 
-1 +2 +1 -2 
13. People worry more about convenience and security of transactions 
than issues of privacy. 
 
-1 -2 -5 +5 
14. Using biometrics means that I can’t lend my car, phone or laptop 
to a friend or relative nor can they lend me theirs. It undermines 
community.  
 
0 -5 -5 -5 
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15. We need to be wary of the possibilities of linking our personal 
data from one database to another for unrelated purposes.  
 
+3 -1 +4 +3 
16. Decentralized global uses of biometric technologies mean that 
nation states no longer have exclusive control over citizens’ data.  
 
1 -1 -2 -1 
17. It would be nice to be able to carry my biometric credentials in a 
piece of personal jewellery.  
 
-4 -2 -1 -1 
18. Biometric technologies supply simple solutions to domestic 
problems, from access control to secure use of kitchen appliances. 
 
-1 -3 0 -2 
19. We urgently need improved authentication to social networking 
sites; biometrics can help here. 
 
-4 -1 0 -1 
20. We need technologies that can prevent people holding fraudulent 
multiple identities. 
 
0 +2 +4 +4 
21. The digital format of biometric records will make this information 
subject to serious security risks. 
 
+2 +1 -3 -3 
22. As a trade-off for faster immigration processing, passengers 
should accept a system where more of their personal data is 
shared internationally. 
 
-4 0 +2 1 
23. No biometric technology is fully secure since it involves a range 
of human decisions, especially in settings such as border control.  
 
+2 +4 -4 +2 
24. Counter-terrorism officials cannot predict terrorism or identify 
terrorists by a biometric sample alone. 
 
+2 -2 0 -2 
25. Asking people to remember multiple passwords rarely works. 
Whether we like it or not, a swipe of the hand may be the answer. 
 
-2 +1 +2 +3 
26. In a globalised world, the state’s task of giving stable identities to  -3 0 +1 +3 
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mobile and versatile populations becomes extremely difficult. 
Biometric residence permits is thus part of the answer.  
27. Digital passports of the future will need to include more biometric 
information to prove who we are. 
 
-2 0 +3 +1 
28. Biometric identifiers need to be used to effectively and securely 
lock foreign nationals into one identity. 
 
-3 0 -1 -4 
29. People suffering from Alzheimers should be implanted with RFID 
chips containing their biometric information to help their families 
track them in case they get lost. 
 
-3 +3 +3 -3 
30. If CCTV can now identify us through face recognition, we should 
be allowed to use headwear, such as glasses called “privacy 
visors”, to maintain our privacy. 
 
0 -5 -3 -3 
31. With each new development in biometric technologies, users are 
getting less control over their data, in terms of knowing when, 
where, and why it is used. 
 
+4 +2 0 -1 
32. It is a good thing that protesters can use their smartphones to 
record police action during demonstrations.  
 
+1 -3 +3 0 
33. It is worrying that all this extra information generated by 
biometric systems can potentially be further used for unintended, 
unauthorized, purposes.  
 
+5 +3 +1 +1 
34. Facial recognition technology reduces the consumer’s ability to 
thwart unwanted tracking since it doesn’t require any personal 
devices. 
 
0 -1 -2 -1 
35. Government needs to adopt biometrics in order to reduce fraud,  -5 +3 +4 +4 
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cut costs and enable them to offer faster, more convenient 
services. 
36. Biometrics information stored on travel documents and the 
processing of such information should respect national data 
protection laws, human rights and cultural practices.  
 
+3 +1 +3 +2 
37. It is worrying that all this central storage is seemingly irreversible; 
the owner of biometric data should be able to control his/her data.  
 
+3 -1 0 -1 
38. I don’t like the fact that biometrics links my personal data 
irrevocably to me. I feel I won’t have the right to be forgotten. 
 
+1 -4 +2 -4 
39. If advertising boards have face recognition technology it is 
important that notices are used to alert consumers.  
 
+1 -1 +1 +1 
40. Border control should take into account objections of passengers 
who find whole-body scanning a humiliating experience. 
 
0 -2 -1 0 
41. Multiple searches of databases with the unique biometric 
identifiers can result in an excessive collection of personal 
information pointing to an individual.  
 
+1 +1 +2 +1 
42. The idea that there may be new biometric technologies that can 
identify me without me ever knowing, makes me uncomfortable. 
 
+4 0 -4 0 
43. It is an exciting time for facial recognition! It is now easily 
available through handheld consumer devices and free software 
packages. 
 
-1 -3 -1 +2 
44. It needs to be acknowledged that biometrics provides a powerful 
weapon to corporations and governments; these are surveillance 
technologies affecting the freedom of individuals and of societies.  
 
+4 +2 0 +1 
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45. Biometric ID systems enable greater surveillance without 
providing increased protection or security for citizens. 
 
+1 -3 -1 -2 
46. The ability of emerging technologies to put “a name to face”, so 
to speak, is going to impact on our careers, credit, health, and 
families. 
 
+2 +1 -1 -3 
47. There’s a need for commercial products that combine tracking and 
location data with individual profile histories from social media to 
monitor people. 
 
-5 -4 -2 -4 
48. The idea that biometrics equals privacy violation, is probably the 
most inaccurate and yet also most widely held view of biometrics. 
 
-2 0 -3 +4 
49. As long as data is well protected, then I think there’s no harm in 
having a biometric ID card. 
 
-2 +4 +5 +5 
50. If we as a society accept biometric technology in the commercial 
form now being marketed, it spells an end to individual privacy as 
we now know it. 
 
+1 -2 -4 0 
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